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ABSTRACT 
Integrating new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, this study 
investigates whether in transition economies, characterized by shifting from centrally 
commanded to more market-oriented economies, there are performance differences among 
family firms (FFs), nonfamily firms (non-FFs), and former state-owned enterprises (former 
SOEs), and whether political connections affect these differences. Our findings suggest that 
FFs outperform non-FFs and former SOEs, unless non-FFs have politically connected CEOs.  
The performance gap in favor of FFs increases at high levels of board political connection 
intensity. Among FFs, the top-performing ones either promote nonfamily leadership or 
combine family leadership with politically connected boards of directors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last few decades, “family capitalism” has proven to be solid and to contribute to 
developing national economies (Schumpeter, 2011; Luo, & Chung, 2005). Nevertheless, it 
differs across cultural and national contexts (Steier, 2009). Addressing those differences 
means avoiding taking paradigms developed in Western economies and applying them 
“blindly” to family firms (FFs) from emerging and/or transition economies (Dinh, & Calabrò, 
2019). Recognizing the specific features of FFs is particularly important in emerging 
economies that are transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one 
(Dana, & Ramadani, 2015; Sensoy, Ozturk, Hacihasanoglu, & Tabak, 2017). This helps 
contextualize the phenomenon and the adopted theories (Gomez-Mejia, Basco, Müller, & 
Gonzalez, 2020).  
FFs in emerging economies are capable of filling the “institutional voids” and 
overcoming market inefficiencies (Chakrabarty, 2009; Ge, Carney, & Kellermanns, 2018; 
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Luo, & Chung, 2013). In particular, they leverage their unique access to family resources and 
capabilities accumulated over generations, such as family social and human capital, long-
term orientation, and strong emotional attachment (Basco, Calabrò, & Campopiano, 2019), 
helping them to outperform their nonfamily counterparts (Jiang, & Peng, 2011; Peng, & 
Jiang, 2010).  
However, it is legitimate to question whether the superior performance of FFs in 
emerging economies also holds in transition economies (Banalieva, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 
2015). This is because most FFs in transition economies are relatively young and facing the 
first succession process, in an environment characterized by active government involvement 
(Xu, & Meyer, 2013). Indeed, in these economies, governments often impose their political 
power and tend to allocate resources favorably to their connected economic organizations, 
especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and those that are able to help them meet their 
developmental goals quickly and efficiently (Tang, Ye, & Zhou, 2013; Faccio, 2006; Sharif, 
Kyid, & Wei, 2015). Consequently, such an institutional context creates high resource 
dependencies forcing firms competing in this uncertain market to access vital and strategic 
resources to survive and grow (Zhou, 2013). Although some studies show that FFs can 
leverage their idiosyncratic advantages, such as loyalty to the family, impetus for 
entrepreneurial drive, informal venture capital, and smaller size enabling adaptation (Singal, 
& Singal, 2011; Steier, 2009), little is known about the extent to which FFs show superior 
performance with respect to non-FFs and former SOEs, which represent the other major types 
of firms in transition economies (Singal, & Singal, 2011). Moreover, in contexts where 
political consensus has a relevant role (Ovaska, & Sobel, 2005), it is important to understand 
how FFs combine their idiosyncratic characteristics and political connections to navigate the 
uncertain and lingering institutional changes, and thus reduce resource dependencies (Wang, 
Ma, Song, & Liu, 2016; Xu, Xu, & Yuan, 2013). Therefore, this study aims to address the 
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following questions: Do FFs (still) outperform other types of firms (non-FFs and former 
SOEs) in transition economies? To what extent does nurturing political connections (by 
having politically connected CEOs and/or boards of directors) contribute to better 
performance levels of FFs over other types of firms in this context? 
Integrating arguments from new institutional economics (Williamson, 2000; 
Williamson, Brousseau, & Glachant, 2008) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, & 
Salancik, 1978; Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003), we contend that in transition economies FFs 
outperform both non-FFs and former SOEs thanks to their idiosyncratic characteristics that 
help them navigate the institutional changes and fill the institutional voids. Furthermore, we 
theorize that FFs benefit from politically connected CEOs and high board of directors’ 
political connection intensity (Faccio, 2006; Chen, Li, Su, & Sun, 2011) to a greater extent 
than non-FFs and former SOEs, thanks to a higher legitimacy and greater access to needed 
resources. Our hypotheses are tested on a sample of Vietnamese listed FFs, non-FFs, and 
former SOEs by using unbalanced panel data from 1,947 firm-year observations (2009-2018), 
through feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). The Vietnamese context is an ideal natural 
laboratory, as it is a transition economy and a single-party-run country that has undergone 
various political and economic reforms, and where the centrally planned economy is 
gradually being replaced by a market-oriented one (Dana & Ramadani, 2015). 
Our main results show that Vietnamese listed FFs outperform both non-FFs and 
former SOEs. However, the significance of the performance gap between FFs and non-FFs 
disappears when they appoint politically connected CEOs. Nonetheless, FFs benefit most 
from a higher performance with respect to both non-FFs and former SOEs when they appoint 
a politically connected board of directors. Our analyses on the subsample of FFs reveal that 
the ones with family CEOs underperform those with non-family CEOs. However, FFs with a 
family CEO achieve better performance by increasing their boards’ political connection 
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intensity. Our study thus suggests that, in transition economies, building and nurturing board 
political connections empowers FFs to use at best their family-specific resources.  
Overall, the findings from this study offer a more fine-grained understanding of the 
performance of FFs in emerging economies (Peng, & Jiang, 2010; Jiang, & Peng, 2011; 
Manikutty, 2000) discussing the peculiar aspects of operating in a transition economy. Our 
contextualized approach brings into the debate the urge to differentiate FFs in transition 
economies from those in “traditional” emerging economies, since FFs in the former 
institutional context benefit from their idiosyncratic characteristics showing better 
performance. Following the debate on the context-sensitive approach in family business 
research (James, Hadjielias, Guerrero, Discua Cruz, & Basco, 2020), we thus add to this 
debate the fundamental role of institutional economics when investigating performance 
differences among diverse firm types in transition economies (Tran, Nonneman, & Jorissen, 
2015). Hence, our findings also contribute to institutional economics advancing that the 
institutional environment plays a key role in shaping the economic landscape and restraining 
or leveraging family idiosyncrasies in a firm to outperform other types of organizations 
(Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima, 2013; Aguilera, & Jackson, 2010). 
Moreover, our findings complement and extend the predictions of resource 
dependence theory (Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978) in the context of 
FFs in a number of ways. This study in fact emphasizes the major role of the board directors, 
through political connections, creating better conditions for their firms in highly resource-
dependent environments (Hillman, 2005; Xin & Pierce, 1996). Our findings also disentangle 
the effects of political connections among their holders. While having a politically connected 
CEO is not relevant for FFs, in transition economies granting resources and gaining 
legitimacy through politically connected directors benefits FFs in terms of performance with 
respect to both non-FFs and former SOEs. Finally, this study also informs practitioners and 
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policymakers. FF owners should be aware that if they want to strive for success in transition 
economies, they should either promote nonfamily leadership or combine family leadership 
with politically connected directors.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
New institutional economics and transition economies 
The core argument of new institutional economics is that “institutions matter and are 
susceptible to analysis” (Williamson, 1996, p. 3). Institutions provide rules, constraints, and 
incentives that are instrumental to governing economic exchange. Indeed, this theory asserts 
the importance of organizations achieving congruence with their institutional context, by 
emphasizing how organizations can achieve legitimacy and respond to surrounding 
institutional changes (Luo, Chung, & Sobczak, 2009). Incorporating new institutional 
economics in investigating a phenomenon in a specific context enables researchers to show 
how distinct national corporate governance systems evolve from, and are aligned with, the 
unique cultural and political configurations and the interests of powerful institutional actors 
embedded in those contexts (Luo et al., 2009; Aguilera, & Jackson, 2010). Therefore, new 
institutional economics offers a suitable theoretical lens through which to study firm 
characteristics and performance in light of the country-specific institutional characteristics 
and changes, given its assumptions on the role of government policies and political risk in 
determining firm strategies, behaviors, and outcomes (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 
2000; Williamson et al., 2008). We advance that these assumptions are particularly useful in 
studying how different types of firms, i.e., FFs, non-FFs, and former SOEs, compete and 
perform in a transition economy like Vietnam, where institutional changes happen at a fast 
pace and significantly affect the economic environment where firms operate (Abegaz, 2005).  
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Reducing dependencies in a changing institutional environment  
Among the core challenges that firms face in transition economies, access to resources to 
facilitate their business activities is crucial. To address this critical issue in an environment 
characterized by institutional voids and swift changes, we integrate new institutional 
economics with resource dependence theory (RDT). The central emphasis of resource 
dependence theory is that firms face a multitude of interdependencies with external actors for 
accessing critical resources (Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, 
firms need to procure resources from, and manage uncertainties caused by, external 
constituents to survive and grow (Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016). Among the external 
constituents, the government is “one of the most difficult environmental dependencies to 
control” (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009, p. 9). Indeed, in transition economies, most 
resources are in the hands of governments and the institutional landscape features a high level 
of uncertainties. Previous research argues that external uncertainties and critical resources can 
be managed and extracted by “resource-rich” senior managers and/or board directors (Peng, 
2004; Hillman et al., 2009).  
Resource dependence theory suggests various mechanisms allowing firms to reduce 
those dependencies, such as hiring an external CEO or filling the board seats with members 
that can reduce the firm dependency on a certain resource (e.g., giving a seat to a member of 
a powerful bank if the firm needs access to financial resources) (Houston, Jiang, Lin, & Ma, 
2014; Xu et al., 2013). Thus, the networking and lobbying role of CEOs and directors, widely 
debated within this stream of literature, could be of utmost importance, especially if the aim 
is to connect firms with the government and/or main political power, which are the 
gatekeepers of specific types of strategic resources at the national level (Sun et al., 2016). 
Connecting to powerful governmental actors is one possible way to reduce resource 
dependencies. Political ties can, indeed, facilitate access to critical information and help 
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influence political decisions, which can affect the corporate landscape as well as grant 
legitimacy to the business (Hillman, 2005; Hillman et al., 2009). Indeed, firms whose CEOs 
strengthen their long-term relationships with numerous politicians and other governmental 
officials (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007) in transition economies could be more competitive 
than other market players (Li, & Zhou, 2005; Leuz, & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Tang et al., 
2013). Moreover, CEOs taking an active role in politics by becoming members of the 
parliament (Morck, & Yeung, 2004), could benefit the firms they lead. CEOs’ political 
connections cultivated through membership in political forums or trade associations (Zhou, 
2013) could help develop personal relationships with regulatory agencies and politicians 
(Houston et al., 2014; Chung, & Ding, 2010).  
Furthermore, firms might consider appointing to the board individuals with political 
ties. This is particularly relevant in transition economies where some forms of organizations, 
which are closer to the ruling political party, might have preferential access to strategic 
resources (Sharif et al., 2015). Thus, firms that are left out have the incentive to create 
linkages with important external actors that can help them to reduce dependency and gain 
resource competitiveness (Hillman, 2005). In sum, in transition economies firms are 
prompted to create political connections by appointing to their boards individuals with 
political ties (Ang, Ding, & Thong, 2013) to solicit political patronage (Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 
2011; Ge et al., 2018). Some research suggests that when there is high dependence on the 
government, listed firms appointing more external directors with strong political ties increase 
their performance (Wu, Wu, & Rui, 2010; Sharif et al., 2015). Accordingly, firms need more 
than one connection to synthesize various resources, such as financing, a lower tax rate, free 
land use, licenses, and favorable legal treatment (Tsai, Wang, Ho, & Lin, 2016; Le, & 
Nguyen, 2009). Thus, it is vital for firms to appoint key individuals who, with their political 
connections, can help reduce uncertainties, manage resource dependencies, and provide 
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Drawing on new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, we advance that, in 
a transition economy, different types of firms (FFs vs. non-FFs and former SOEs) rely on 
different characteristics to reduce institutional uncertainties and changes. Moreover, we 
theorize that building political connections, aimed at reducing the dependencies on external 
constituencies, help them access the needed resources and positively affect their performance.  
 The debate on FFs in emerging markets has suggested that they outperform their 
nonfamily counterparts as they leverage the benefits of family control , which enable them to 
cope with the institutional voids of those markets (Peng, & Jiang, 2010; Jiang, & Peng, 
2011). By acknowledging that governments still have a strong power in transition economies 
(Yiu, Bruton, & Lu, 2005), it becomes fundamental to challenge the current understanding of 
the sources of advantages that FFs can leverage in traditional emerging economies. Thus, in 
the following sections, we incorporate the idiosyncratic characteristics of FFs in transition 
economies, strongly building on the knowledge about different types of family capitalism in 
different institutional contexts (Schumpeter, 2011; Steier, 2009). 
 
Firm performance in transition economies  
We suggest that FFs in transition economies benefit from specific advantages with respect to 
other types of firms. In the following sections, we thus argue why FFs outperform nonfamily 




FFs vs. non-FFs  
In a hostile environment, with a high risk of government expropriation, a dearth of legal 
protection, and limited access to resources (Tang et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006; Guriev, 2004; 
Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2000), both FFs and non-FFs face hindrances 
that require them to fully leverage their own idiosyncrasies to boost firm performance.  
Non-FFs are believed to have advantages in dynamic environments, typically in 
transition economies, due to their emphasis on efficiency, flexible human resource 
management, and short-term goals, which make them establish new business paradigms 
ahead of institutional changes (Cannella Jr, Jones, & Withers, 2015; Gedajlovic, Carney, 
Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012). However, despite both FFs and non-FFs were legally 
allowed to develop in the late 1980s, it is important to know that during 1955-1975 Vietnam 
was divided into two countries, South Vietnam and North Vietnam. South Vietnam followed 
capitalist market-free economy where numerous FFs existed before being confiscated when 
the country was officially reunified in 1976 (Gettleman, Franklin, Young, & Franklin, 1995). 
A large number of FFs from the South then restarted their business operations in 1980s when 
the country removed the forbiddance of private ownership (Bui, & Nunoi, 2008; Luong, & 
Diep, 1991). This means that some business families had gained business experience before 
being expropriated, and their business “secrets” had been maintained, passed to the next 
family generation, and kept by family members (Luong, & Diep, 1991). Now they are legally 
allowed to be “reborn,” creating an enormous desire to develop and leading to a greater 
commitment to develop and sustain their businesses for the wealth of their families after 
decades of being prohibited (Luong, & Diep, 1991). Moreover, during lingering transitions, 
resources quickly erode as firms struggle to adapt to new institutional changes (Banalieva et 
al., 2015). In this context, only being efficient is not enough, but also being adaptive and 
deploying enduring resource capacity can help firms survive and prosper (McMillan, & 
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Woodruff, 2002). Specifically, given the unequal institutional developments in transition 
economies, institutional voids and uncertainties persist (Khanna, & Palepu, 1997), requiring 
firms to develop strategies that could substitute for formal institutional support (Dinh, & 
Calabrò, 2019; Ge et al., 2018).  
In this institutional context, research shows that FFs have advantages over non-FFs in 
coping with the institutional reforms in transition economies thanks to family idiosyncratic 
characteristics (Banalieva et al., 2015). First, emphasis is placed on informal relationships, 
social capital, and trust (Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 2010). When the access to resources 
through formal channels is limited, FFs are able to develop and exploit resources through 
informal networks and social capital (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Peng, & Jiang, 
2010; Salvato, & Melin, 2008). They can, indeed, leverage their family status, which 
encourages long-term support and reciprocal relationships with different stakeholders, via 
more extensive connections and family ties with outside stakeholders (Miller, Lee, Chang, & 
Breton-Miller, 2009). Second, the fact that family leaders are able to commit their family 
resources and put forward their reputational credibility or “face” (Dinh, & Calabrò, 2019) 
fosters their responsibility to honor commitments and increases their organizational resilience 
that would make them resist even in adverse times. This echoes the literature suggesting that 
FFs can rely on informal and survivability capital (Steier, 2009). Third, the long-term 
orientation that characterizes FFs is particularly relevant in transition economies, where FFs 
can benefit from the alignment of interests between family shareholders and the firm (Singal, 
& Singal, 2011), especially thanks to the loyalty to the family and the obligation to provide 
wealth for the family as a driver for being entrepreneurial (Steier, 2009). Finally, FFs are 
known for treating their employees with unusual consideration to form a “cohesive internal 
community” (Miller et al., 2009). Such intimate relationships are at the heart of the 
stewardship culture of FFs (Singal, & Singal, 2011) that, in transition economies, are 
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believed to compensate in the long run for the lack of institutional infrastructure (Miller et al., 
2009; Ge et al., 2018), helping them overcome lingering institutional challenges (Banalieva et 
al., 2015; Chan et al., 2010).  
These arguments would suggest that FFs have a unique opportunity to build on their 
family idiosyncrasies, which would put them in a stronger position to outperform non-FFs in 
transition economies. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: In transition economies, listed family firms outperform nonfamily 
firms.  
 
FFs vs. former SOEs 
Besides non-FFs, FFs in transition economies coexist with former SOEs. Soon after private 
firms were allowed to populate the market, governments in transition economies also 
restructured their SOEs to rescue poor-performing SOEs via the mechanism of privatization 
or equitization (Nguyen, & Van Dijk, 2012; Vo, Swierczek, & Nguyen, 2013). It was 
expected that equitization would change the ownership of SOEs, attract more investments 
from the private sector, and improve the performance of these former SOEs (Vo et al., 2013).  
Despite the effort, privatization of SOEs, especially in Vietnam, has remained modest 
and is found to target small SOEs and not larger ones, thus not addressing the efficiency 
problem (Sjöholm, 2006). Although ownership and management structures in former SOEs 
have changed to a certain extent, governments often retain their control by remaining as 
block shareholders and appointing politicians or state representatives in senior leadership 
positions (Vo et al., 2013). The continued interference of governments is often associated 
with mismanagement resulting from coalition between managers and politicians in former 
SOEs (Carney, & Hamilton-Hart, 2015), who maneuver the companies just for their personal 
gain (Fan, Wei, & Xu, 2011; Shleifer, 1998). Indeed, their activities are often driven by 
sociopolitical goals, which are at odds with shareholders’ wealth maximization (Singal, & 
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Singal, 2011). Furthermore, the emergence and changes in ownership and management in 
former SOEs often lead to new organizational complexity and conflicts between new and 
existing shareholders (Tran et al., 2015). These governance inefficiencies are reflected in the 
very low productivity of this type of corporation (Fan et al., 2011). As a result, it takes time 
for former SOEs to adapt to their new institutional economic environment and be relatively 
competitive with respect to private firms, including FFs (Loc, Lanjouw, & Lensink, 2006).  
 In contrast to former SOEs, FFs leverage on aligned objectives between family 
shareholders and their firms. They exhibit a stewardship orientation that fosters motivation 
based on higher commitment to the firm and a higher degree of trust, thereby reducing 
opportunistic behavior (Singal, & Singal, 2011), as “one does not steal his own money” 
(Peng, & Jiang, 2010, p. 255). Additionally, family commitment can support enhanced 
organizational responsiveness, facilitating the identification and rapid exploitation of 
profitable opportunities (Miller, & Breton‐Miller, 2006; Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & 
Craig, 2008) in transition economies. Hence, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1b: In transition economies, listed family firms outperform former SOEs.  
 
The moderating role of political connections in reducing resource dependencies  
As mentioned before, the institutional environment in transition economies poses several 
challenges, due to the immature economic institutions and continuous changes in laws and 
regulations (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Firms face a shortage of 
resources (Opper, 2008) and need to seek alternatives to secure strategic resources to reduce 
their dependencies on the environment. In transition economies, firms that secure political 
consent have a higher likelihood of sustaining their business (Ovaska, & Sobel, 2005). 
Accordingly, and in line with the predictions of new institutional economics and resource 
dependence theory, political ties can substitute for inadequate market infrastructure and 
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reduce transaction costs (Peng, & Luo, 2000; Xin, & Pearce, 1996; Zheng, Singh, & Chung, 
2017). 
In the following sections, we discuss the benefits that FFs can achieve by having 
politically connected CEOs and boards of directors to boost their performance with respect to 
non-FFs and former SOEs in transition economies.  
 
Politically connected CEOs and FFs’ performance  
We distinguish between political ties established by the CEO and by the board of directors. 
CEOs can be particularly capable of managing resource dependencies (Finkelstein, Cannella, 
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009) that have been proved to be highly relevant during institutional 
transitions (Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008; Peng, & Luo, 2000; Shi, Markóczy, & Stan, 
2014; Li, & Zhang, 2007). Thanks to their political ties, they have access to a better set of 
strategic resources that have a greater impact on firm performance (Young, & Tsai, 2008; Li 
et al., 2008).  
FFs can particularly benefit from politically connected CEOs. First, given that FFs 
rely on the interest alignment of family shareholders and the business itself, having politically 
connected CEOs can help access critical information on regulatory changes at an early stage 
(Chung, & Ding, 2010), thus making them choose strategies to ensure the pursuit of family-
centered objectives. Moreover, their typical long-term orientation makes FFs view political 
connections as their specialized assets (Bennedsen, Fan, Jian, & Yeh, 2015) that they would 
like to pass to the next generation (Bertrand, & Schoar, 2006; Xu, Yuan, Jiang, & Chan, 
2015). Thus, family owners tend to handle political connections with care (Dou, & Li, 2013), 
nurturing and preserving them without merely exploiting and exhausting them (Liu, Luo, & 
Tian, 2015). The CEOs’ political ties or their own participation in the political life of the 
14 
country are incorporated into the unique social capital of FFs, which they can better nurture 
and leverage on, as part of their family advantage.  
This can be significantly important, especially in comparison with non-FFs that tend 
to exploit such political connections for short-term objectives (Qian, Pan, & Yeung, 2011) or 
former SOEs whose managers are motivated by their individual interests (Fan et al., 2011; 
Shleifer, 1998). Indeed, in non-FFs, political connections are associated with worse 
performance (Fan et al., 2007). The “grabbing hand” between majority shareholders and 
politicians leading to severe expropriation of minority shareholders in non-FFs and former 
SOEs led by politically connected CEOs significantly and negatively influences firm value 
and performance (Cheung, Jing, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2005; Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2011). 
Additionally, the continued political interference in former SOEs may conflict with the new 
shareholders’ profit maximization goal and impede improvement efforts, thereby being 
detrimental rather than beneficial (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008; Leuz, & Oberholzer-
Gee, 2006). In sum, political connections in FFs can complement their family-specific 
idiosyncrasies in transition economies and sustain their performance with respect to non-FFs 
and former SOEs in transition economies (You, & Du, 2012; Zhou, 2013). In other words: 
Hypothesis 2: In transition economies, having politically connected CEOs strengthens 
the superior performance of listed family firms with respect to non-FFs and former 
SOEs. 
 
Board of directors’ political connection intensity and FFs’ performance  
In the above-presented theoretical background, we consider the critical role played by boards 
of directors in managing external resource dependencies by procuring access to strategic 
resources (Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978). Board 
directors use their networks and their standing to gain and maintain legitimacy and influence 
within the political circles they belong to (Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, 2005), which 
in return could positively affect firm performance. 
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In the continuously changing institutional environment, FFs benefit most from boards 
of directors’ political connection intensity. Securing the needed resources would help FFs 
back up their family idiosyncrasies, leveraging their business “secrets” that reside in the 
family (Luong, & Diep, 1991) and accessing the network that can maximize the exploitation 
of the accumulated knowledge. However, one director cannot possess connections that open 
up all types of resources and gain the legitimacy that FFs might need to survive in their 
competitive arena. Thus, appointing multiple directors, with several political ties, leading to 
multiple interlocking directorships (Lester, & Cannella, 2006), could significantly reduce 
resource dependencies (Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978). In fact, laws and legal 
enforcements in transition economies are either weak or absent, and disputes among parties 
are likely to happen (Young et al., 2008). In these situations, having directors with political 
ties can provide FFs with the needed legal protection (Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, & Wong, 
2005) to avoid legal actions, secure political bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006), 
or reduce the cost of dispute settlements (Tang et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2016). Moreover, in 
the context of resource scarcity, having multiple connected directors would offer FFs 
different resources, including favorable interest and tax rates and/or free use of land, 
obtaining licenses more easily, and facing less bureaucracy (Xu et al., 2013; Adhikari, 
Derashid, & Zhang, 2006; Li et al., 2008). This concerted lobbying activity by board 
directors complements and strengthens the available informal capital that FFs rely on to 
navigate the continuous and lingering institutional changes in transition economies (Steier, 
2009; Banalieva et al., 2015).  
These political actions by boards of directors could also benefit non-FFs and former 
SOEs, but to a limited extent. This is because non-FFs pursue short-term goals that might 
become quickly obsolete in light of the lingering changes in the economic landscape, and 
former SOEs that suffer from detrimental activities by their management and severe 
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overinvestment problems (Braendle, Gasser, & Noll, 2005). In sum, political connection 
intensity at the board level benefits FFs’ performance with respect to non-FFs and former 
SOEs because of the board directors’ ability to access resources and represent the business 
interests in political circles. Thus, this complements the idiosyncratic resources of FFs with 
vital networks and helps gain legitimacy. Considering the foregoing, we state: 
Hypothesis 3: In transition economies, high board political connection intensity 
strengthens the superior performance of listed family firms with respect to non-FFs 
and former SOEs. 
 
 
METHODS AND ANALYSES 
Contextualizing the institutional and governance landscape in Vietnam 
Vietnam differs from other emerging economies in Southeast Asia due to its historical 
development. Vietnam declared its independence from French Indochina and announced the 
creation of the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” in 1945 and followed communist regime. 
However, during 1955-1975, South Vietnam declared its independence from the North and 
named the “Republic of Vietnam” and followed capital list market-free economy (Gettleman 
et al. 1995). After the country’s reunification in 1976, the whole nation continued the 
communist regime and private ownership was forbidden (Nguyen, & Van Dijk, 2012; Bui, & 
Nunoi, 2008). In 1986, the Vietnamese government introduced a program of national 
economic reform (Doi Moi) with the aim of fostering economic growth. In 1990, the Law on 
Private Enterprises came into effect forcing the government to restructure and privatize (also 
known as “equitization” or “recapitalization”) poor-performing SOEs (Bui, & Nunoi, 2008; 
Nguyen, & Van Dijk, 2012) and allowing private firms to develop (Bui, & Nunoi, 2008), 
paving the way for developing the transition economy of Vietnam as we know it today 
(Sjöholm, 2006). These institutional changes, however, did not lead to immediate positive 
effects in the following years as they needed a long time to be implemented, and still need 
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amendments (Phung, & Hoang, 2013). In this economic landscape, the largest number of 
listed firms on the two stock markets in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock markets 
(HoSE and HNX, respectively), are mainly privatized SOEs. Although these firms have now 
become “nonstate” firms (also called “former SOEs”) after selling shares to public investors, 
the state remains a block shareholder (HoSE, 2014). The rest are family-controlled firms and 
non-FFs (Robinett, Benedetta, & Nguyet Anh, 2013).  
The private sector (i.e., FFs and non-FFs) has contributed significantly to the 
Vietnamese economy. Experiencing growth from almost nothing before 1990, the 
Vietnamese private sector produced 66% of the total industrial output in 2000, and nearly 
73% in 2004 (GSO, 2005). Private firms accounted for approximately 97% of the total 
number of enterprises, employed nearly 77% of total employment, and contributed to the 
economy with 41% of GDP (Can, 2017). However, the vast majority (about 90%) of private 
firms are small and medium-sized (Hakkala, & Kokko, 2007).  
Despite its progress, the Vietnamese economy still carries the main characteristics of a 
transition economy (Do, & Wu, 2014), and private firms in this country suffer from political 
and social discrimination. The overall political environment has indeed remained antipathetic 
towards privately owned firms. The State Securities Commission of Vietnam tends to give 
priority for listing to SOEs and firms in which SOEs have a stake while private firms must 
fulfill more requirements (Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008). As a result, this leads to a lower amount of 
private firms being listed on the stock exchange. Additionally, the development of private 
firms has been hampered by limited access to external resources (Li et al., 2008; Wu et al., 
2010), red tape, and tax burdens (Johnson, Schnatterly, Johnson, & Chiu, 2010; Guriev, 
2004). If disputes arise, decisions are made in favor of SOEs or former SOEs (Le Minh, & 
Walker, 2008; Morck, & Yeung, 2004).  
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The corporate governance of a Vietnamese listed firm is similar to that of a firm listed 
according to the Australian and the British company law, a shareholding company in Chinese 
company law, and an AG in German company law (Le Minh, & Walker, 2008). The 
corporate governance structure of a listed firm in Vietnam typically encompasses: 1) 
shareholders’ meetings (also called “general meetings of shareholders”); 2) a board of 
directors; 3) a supervisory board (also called a “control board”); and 4) a general director or 
CEO. In this sense, the governance structure of listed firms in Vietnam follows a two-tier 
system, including both a board of management and a supervisory board (Bui, & Nunoi, 2008; 
Tran, Koufopoulos, & Warner, 2014). However, unlike the German supervisory board, which 
has strong power and can appoint and dismiss members of the board of management, the 
supervisory board in Vietnamese listed firms actually plays a limited and indirect role. Their 
monitoring role over the management board is usually bypassed by controlling shareholders 
(Adhikari, & Le, 2014). In contrast, the board of management has a more direct role in the 
firm’s operations and can make recommendations to the shareholders’ meeting (Le Minh, & 
Walker, 2008). The management board consists of a chairperson, executive and non-
executive directors.  
This study focuses on the board of management (also called “board of directors”) and 
the CEO. This is because members of this board, including the chairperson and the CEO, are 
the ones who are likely to have political connections in the firm. They have direct impact on 
the strategic orientation of the firm, and are highly involved in the daily operational and 
managerial decision-making processes (Le Minh, & Walker, 2008). Moreover, it is very 
common for members of the board, including the chairperson, to simultaneously occupy other 




Data, sample, and variables 
Our sample consists of nonfinancial Vietnamese firms listed on the Hanoi Stock Exchange 
(HNX) and Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HoSE) from 2009 to 2018 as provided by 
Vietstock (http://vietstock.vn). Since this study focuses on political connections, we exclude 
listed SOEs ultimately controlled by the government (owning more than 51%), because 
political connections in (these) SOEs are imposed by the government rather than sought by 
the firms. Information on political connections is manually collected from the firms’ annual 
reports and corporate governance reports. Moreover, such information is triangulated with 
other sources, including online newspapers covering finance and stock market information. 
We merge the data collected manually with data provided by Vietstock (e.g., return on assets 
and other financial variables) to obtain the final database. Our final sample represents an 
unbalanced panel data set with 1,947 firm-year observations from 200 firms.  
Dependent variable. Firm performance is measured by using return on assets (ROA), 
which is one of the most common measures used in corporate governance studies (Li et al., 
2008; Wu et al., 2012).  
Independent variables. To test our hypotheses, four main predictors are constructed. 
First, the variable types_of_firm distinguishes among FFs, non-FFs, and former SOEs. 
Accordingly, a firm is defined as FF if (i) the family owns at least 5% of the firm’s shares, 
and (ii) the ultimate controlling shareholder is a family member and/or this family member is 
simultaneously involved in the firm’s senior leadership (e.g., CEO, chairperson, board 
member, and/or member of the TMT). This is a standard criterion for analyzing listed FFs 
(e.g., Chrisman, & Patel, 2012; Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008). Former SOEs are 
detected by looking at the firm’s history published on the website of cafef.vn, which tells us 
in which year the firm was established and what ministry governed it, and in which year it 
was privatized. By checking the shareholder structure, we assess whether the government 
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remains a shareholder with more than 5% and up to 49% of shares. We also check whether 
state employees are involved in senior leadership positions. When listed firms have the 
government currently owning between 5% and 49% of the shares and there are still state 
representatives in senior leadership positions, this means that these firms were previously 
SOEs. In this case, we label them as former SOEs. Finally, non-FFs are those listed firms that 
are not former SOEs and have no current family involvement in leadership and ownership. 
Therefore, our types_of_firm variable takes the value of 1 when the firm is an FF, 2 when the 
firm is a former SOE, and 3 when the firm is a non-FF. From this categorical variable 
(types_of_firm), we create three dummy variables – family_firm, nonfamily_firm, and 
former_SOE – that take the value 1 when the firm is classified, respectively, as an FF, non-
FF, and former SOE, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, to explore family firm heterogeneity for 
the FF sample, we create a variable called Family_CEO that takes the value 1 when the CEO 
is a member of the owning family, and 0 otherwise.  
We gather information on political connections from different sources. However, the 
main source was the cafef.vn website, which provides background information on education, 
and the previous and current careers of board members and CEOs. To define whether a firm 
has political connections, we consider whether (i) the CEO (Tang et al., 2013) or their 
immediate relatives (e.g., father, mother, sibling, spouse, and adult children) (Li et al., 2008) 
and/or (ii) board members were or are currently politicians, officials of the government, 
industry bureaucrats, military officers (Li, He, Lan, & Yiu, 2012), or members of policy 
forums and/or trade associations (e.g., Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry) 
(Chung, & Ding, 2010). This information is manually collected and we use two variables to 
proxy political connections: politically connected CEO and board of directors’ political 
connection intensity.  
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The variable politically_connected_CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the CEO meets one of the aforementioned political connection criteria, and 0 otherwise. The 
variable board of directors’ political connection intensity measures the degree of political 
connections in the boardroom. Unlike previous studies on political connections, which 
investigate “low” and “high” levels of connections, for instance leading cadre vs. local cadre 
(Zhou, 2013), “direct” and “indirect” connection, or connected through a top government 
officials vs. connected through a friend (Faccio et al., 2006), our article examines the board 
political connection intensity. Board political connection intensity is measured by 
considering the number of board members that meet the political connection criteria divided 
by the total number of directors. The CEO is not counted when appointed in a dual function.  
Control variables. We use several control variables. First, firm age, measured as the 
logarithm of years since the firm was founded, is included as more established firms could 
have better levels of ROA (Chu, 2009). Second, firm size, measured as the logarithm of total 
assets, may also affect ROA (Cai, Luo, & Wan, 2012) since bigger firms are more prepared 
to exploit economies of scale. Third, firm leverage, measured as total debt divided by total 
assets (Cheng, Lin, & Wei, 2015), could influence performance because high leverage would 
increase firms’ interest payment costs and may thus harm firm performance. We also control 
for CEO duality to avoid the dual power effect on performance (Li et al., 2012); yet, board 
size is controlled to capture the relative effect of politically connected directors without the 
difficulties associated with interpreting ratio variables (Hillman, 2005). Finally, for FFs only 
we calculate the percentage of shares held by family members (% Family_Ownership) as an 
additional control variable measuring ownership concentration that could affect our 
dependent variables (Mazzi, 2011). Finally, at the individual level, we add CEO_Age, 
measured in years, which could affect firm performance because of accumulated CEO 
experience (human capital proxy). Table 1 provides a list of variables used in this study. 
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--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
Data analysis  
We test our hypotheses using panel data by considering firm-year as the unit of analysis. 
Following Baltagi and Wu (1999) and Desender, Aguilera, Lópezpuertas‐Lamy and Crespi 
(2016), we adopt the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression model, which 
provides reliable estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002). This 
technique allows estimation in the presence of autoregressive, AR(1), disturbances within 
panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroscedasticity across panels. Indeed, the 
models are pretested for autocorrelation using xtserial (Drukker, 2003) and the results show 
the significant statistic for the presence of serial correlation. Furthermore, for our specific 
data set, this regression technique has a number of advantages over fixed effects (FE) 
estimation. First, FE estimation requires significant within-panel variation of the variable 
values to produce consistent and efficient estimates (Desender et al., 2016). Second, FE 
estimates may aggravate the problem of multicollinearity if solved with least squares dummy 
variables (Baltagi, Bratberg, & Holmås, 2005). Third, FE typically produces biased estimates 
of the fixed effects when the time period is relatively short (Jensen, & Zajac, 2004; 
Chintagunta, Jain, & Vilcassim, 1991). Finally, our variable of interest (type of firm) is time 
invariant. Since the study uses a panel data set, dummy variables for years (to capture year 
fixed effects) and industries (to control for industry fixed effects) are included in the models 
(Joh, 2003). The inclusion of year and industry fixed effects allows the inherent heterogeneity 
in strategic orientation across years and/or industries to be addressed.  
We further check the probability of reverse causality as a source of endogeneity. We 
could not find instrumental variables to satisfy the necessary validity criteria to be applied in 
our models. Thus, we control for this potential problem by using lagged independent 
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variables. Additionally, although we do not believe that ROA is going to affect the family 
status of the firm, it could affect family ownership since nonfamily investors may be attracted 
to firms with higher profitability. Furthermore, ROA could affect the board of directors’ 
political connection intensity as profitable firms could be more attractive to well-connected 
board members. Following Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010), we do not find that ROA 
explains changes in family ownership (percentage of shares) and boards of directors’ political 
connection intensity. We examine variance inflation factors (VIFs) to exclude potential biases 
in the regression models. VIF values are lower than the cutoff point of 10, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a significant problem (Cai et al., 2012; Netter, & Knut, 1990).  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all variables used in this 
study. Listed FFs account for almost 30% (60 firms and 592 firm-year observations), non-FFs 
account for 51% (102 firms and 981 firm-year observations), and former SOEs account for 
19% (38 firms and 374 firm-year observations). Our sampled FF operate in most of major 
economic sectors in Vietnam, especially in agriculture and fisheries, footwear and textile, 
trade, construction and real estate, pharmacy and medical equipment manufacturer. Some 
others operate in confectionary, steel manufacturing, printing and packaging industry. 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
With regard to political connections, while 28% of the sampled firms have politically 
connected boards (this percentage varies slightly from one year to another, and is not shown 
in Table 2 and was calculated based on the number of firms with at least one board member 
connected), around 46% of the cases have politically connected CEOs. This latter percentage 
is higher than the one reported by Fan et al. (2007), which is 28% of CEOs in 617 publicly 
listed companies in China between 1993 and 2000 that have political connections. These 
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findings indicate a higher propensity of Vietnamese firms to build and rely on political 
connections. As regards the subsample of listed FFs, 28% of the FFs have at least one 
politically connected board member and 39% have a politically connected CEO.  
The results of FGLS regressions are reported in Table 3 for the overall sample. In 
Model 1, we introduce all control variables. In Model 2, we add our main explanatory 
variables (family_firm is used as control group to be compared with the two dummy variables 
introduced in the equation that account respectively for nonfamily firm and former SOE) and 
find that FFs outperform non-FFs (ß = -.898, p < .05) and former SOEs (ß = -1.013, p < 
.001). Therefore, these findings support Hypothesis 1. Additionally, we observe that having a 
politically connected CEO (CEO_connected) or high board of directors’ political connection 
intensity (board_political_connection_intensity) is positively and significantly related to 
return on assets (ß = .422 p < .1 and ß = 2.573 p < .05, respectively). 
Model 3 introduces the interaction term between types of firms and politically 
connected CEOs to test our Hypothesis 2. The proposed interaction produces six possible 
combinations, and to perform our analysis we leave one combination out (i.e., Family 
Firms*CEO_Connected) as a reference group. We partially find support for our Hypothesis 
2. While we did not find that FFs with politically connected CEOs outperform non-FFs with 
politically connected ones (ß = -0.550 but not significant p < .254), they did outperform 
former SOEs with politically connected CEOs (ß = -1.424, p < .004). Post estimation 
analyses show that the effect size of the moderation is low; however, the small effect size is 
common in psychology and management fields (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005; Aiken 
& West, 1991). To visually interpret the moderation, Figure 1 shows the six possible 
interactions between types of firms and politically connected CEOs. It is interesting to 
observe that non-FFs benefit most in terms of performance when having politically connected 
CEOs. 
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--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
Model 4 shows the interaction term between types of firms and board of directors’ 
political connection intensity to test Hypothesis 3. Both coefficients are negative and 
significant (ß = -9.851 p < .01 and ß = -10.540, p < .01), suggesting that FFs with a high 
intensity of political connections within their boards outperform non-FFs and former SOEs 
with high political connection intensity in the boards, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. We plot 
these interactions in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows that FFs benefit most from having 
politically connected board members (i.e., the higher the board political connection intensity, 
the higher the firm’s performance gap in favor of FFs). To understand better the interaction 
effect compared to non-FFs and former SOEs, Figure 3 shows the conditional marginal effect 
of FFs vs. non-FFs as well as FFs vs. former SOEs at different levels of board of directors’ 
political connection intensity. While FFs have better firm performance, the performance gap 
is significant with respect to non-FFs and former SOEs when board political connection 
intensity is higher than about 15%.  
--- Insert Table 3 about here ---  
--- Insert Figure 2 and 3 about here --- 
    
Exploring heterogeneity within the group of family firms 
FFs are not homogeneous entities (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012), and looking at 
whether their performance could vary depending on whether the CEO is a family member or 
not (Jiang, & Peng, 2011), we further investigate what makes FFs successful. Table 4 shows 
the FGLS regressions for FFs only. In Model 1, we introduce our control variables and in 
Model 2 the main explanatory variable Family_CEO. The Family_CEO coefficient is 
negative and significant (ß = -2.069, p < .001), showing that in transition economies having a 
family CEO is negatively related to firm performance. In Model 4, we introduce the 
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interaction term between having a family CEO and board political connection intensity. This 
is positive and marginally significant (ß = 10.424, p < .10). Figure 4 shows the moderation 
effect of board political connection intensity on the relationship between a family CEO and 
firm performance. To better interpret this relationship, Figure 5 shows the conditional 
marginal effect between a family CEO and nonfamily CEO at different levels of board 
political connection intensity. The lower firm performance associated with having a family 
CEO is compensated for when FFs incorporate politically connected board members.  
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
--- Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here --- 
 
We also perform some robustness checks. We first use a different measure for firm 
performance, i.e., return on equity (ROE), and our results remain consistent when using it as 
an alternative dependent variable. Second, to see if our results are stable when changing the 
time period and they are not driven by any specific event, we run our model by removing 
one, two, and three years and there are no significant changes in our results, i.e., our results 
are stable over time. Those additional tests are available upon request. 
 
DISCUSSION  
The aim of this study is to investigate whether FFs perform better (as commonly found in 
emerging economies) or worse than non-FFs and former SOEs in transition economies. We 
argue that in the context of high resource dependencies resulting from changing and adapting 
economic institutions (Williamson et al., 2008; Williamson, 2000), FFs may still outperform 
both non-FFs and former SOEs thanks to their family-related idiosyncrasies (Steier, 2009; 
Singal, & Singal, 2011), which grant them significant advantages (Ge et al., 2018; Luo, & 
Chung, 2005). Furthermore, we also investigated the extent to which having politically 
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connected CEOs and/or boards of directors could further support FFs in managing their 
resource dependencies on governments and help them overcome the disadvantages in terms 
of access to resources in transition economies.  
In line with our theoretical reasoning, we find that FFs outperform both non-FFs and 
former SOEs. First, these findings support our argumentation that FFs can leverage better on 
their family idiosyncrasies, i.e., a stewardship culture, family loyalty and obligation to 
business, and the ability to nurture and exploit more efficiently their social and survivability 
capital making them more resilient than non-FFs in transition economies. Additionally, the 
outperformance of FFs as compared to non-FFs in the context of the Vietnamese transition 
economy can also be explained by the fact that FFs had already generated business 
experience before the communist regime (Luong, & Diep, 1991; Dang, & Vo, 2019). Unlike 
non-FFs, FFs aim to nurture, preserve, and transmit family legacy (Rutherford, & Kuratko, 
2016; Hammond, Pearson, & Holt, 2016); thus, they have a greater ability to maintain that 
previously acquired experience within the family, and then transfer the accumulated 
knowledge and “business secrets” to the next family generation. Indeed, there are FFs that 
existed before the centrally commanded economy. Soon after the economic liberation, these 
business families resumed their business (Luong, & Diep, 1991; Dang, & Vo, 2019). Thus, 
business families can leverage those non-tradable features that engender those idiosyncrasies 
to outperform non-FFs.  
Second, FFs also outperform former SOEs, thus supporting the view that former 
SOEs might suffer from inefficiencies and goal diversity. In fact, SOEs in Vietnam have been 
identified as being responsible for the stagnant economy leading to numerous privatizations 
of inefficient SOEs at the beginning of the 2000s (Nguyen, & Van Dijk, 2012), with 
politicians aiming at goals that are misaligned with shareholders’ wealth maximization 
(Singal, & Singal, 2011). Despite some evidence showing that performance in former SOEs 
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is improved, this improvement is only acknowledged among themselves when considering 
pre- and post-privatization (Tran et al., 2015; Loc et al., 2006). Moreover, the transformation 
from state-owned to privately owned entities required time to adopt new organizational 
structures and adapt to more liberalized market conditions. Indeed, there are studies 
suggesting that the performance of former SOEs was improved if they actively implemented 
organizational integration, and those with less state ownership performed better (Vo et al., 
2013). Conversely, recently established FFs might leverage more energetic impetus in 
addition to leverage on their family-related characteristics (Steier, 2009). As a result, FFs 
spare no effort and take up all of their opportunities to develop.  
However, as is evident in Figure 1, we find that non-FFs (instead of FFs) benefit most 
from having politically connected CEOs, who help them close the performance gap with 
respect to FFs. This suggests that CEOs’ political ties in FFs do not represent a significant 
contingent effect to boost FF performance. This finding is intriguing and casts further 
questions for future research to look closer into this matter. Nonetheless, possible explanation 
for this finding could be that, in non-FFs connected CEOs are free, at greater extent, to have  
their political resources incorporated in their strategies without being scrutinized by “big 
brother eyes” (the owning families). Yet, the performance improvement in non-FFs with 
politically connected CEOs is also consistent with the prediction of RDT. On the other hand, 
as argued earlier, FFs tend to handle political connections with care and avoid exploiting or 
exhausting them. Thus, connected CEOs in FFs may need to get “approved” by owning 
families when they want to exploit such resources through political connections. The “big 
brother eyes” may delay political resource implementation, thus, leading to the insignificant 
effects of connected CEOs in FFs. 
As predicted, our results suggest that the performance gap between FFs and non-FFs 
as well as between FFs and former SOEs becomes higher when the political connection 
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intensity of the board increases. Having politically connected directors on the board helps 
listed FFs solicit political patronage to protect their interests, and gain legitimacy and access 
to resources (Hillman, 2005; Li et al., 2008). Indeed, a multiple-connected board provides 
owning family with a filter mechanim allowing FFs to recheck, reflect and finally ratify what 
the strategic directions that were proposed by the CEOs. This practice combines with the 
unique FF idiosyncratic features, including family direct involvement, family loyalty and 
commitment (Basco et al., 2019; Steier, 2009; Jiang, & Peng, 2011), enabling FFs to 
outperform their counterparts. Additionally, FFs often view political connections as a special 
asset, especially when operating in economies where institutions change and evolve rapidly 
(Zheng et al., 2017; Zhou, 2013). Therefore, family owners might particularly want those 
political connections to grow, be nurtured, expanded, and hopefully be passed down to the 
next generations (Xu et al., 2015). Furthermore, family owners often develop more personal 
and more extensive relationships (Dou, & Li, 2013; Miller et al., 2009), engaging in long-
term exchanges with the intention to include them in their “family guanxi circle” (Chen, & 
Chen, 2004; Dinh, & Calabrò, 2019; Dinh & Hilmarsson, 2020). This helps FFs secure the 
trust of these actors who, in return, are more prone to act in favor of FFs in the long run 
(Miller et al., 2009). Meanwhile, politically connected directors may prefer to develop a 
mutual and long-term relationship with FFs as they see those firms as a new form of 
capitalism with the potential to develop into the main and sustainable economic force of the 
country.  
Given that not all FFs are alike, we further explored possible performance differences 
in the FF subgroup between FFs with nonfamily leadership and those with family leadership. 
Our findings suggest that FFs with family CEOs have a lower performance with respect to 
their peers with nonfamily CEOs, independently of political connections. To better 
understand this finding (Figure 3), it is necessary to contextualize it within the Vietnamese 
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economy. On the one hand, most Vietnamese FFs are in their first generation. Family 
legitimacy and networks are still too underdeveloped to be a source of highly competitive 
advantage to be exploited by family CEOs. On the other hand, FFs may be too busy to 
prepare for their first succession (Viet, 2015) in which exiting family CEOs need to prepare 
the business for their descendants, while young family leaders learn to accumulate 
experience. Additionally, although family CEOs may have political connections through 
participating in politics, connected family CEOs are new and may be inexperienced in a 
fierce political arena in transition economies. Furthermore, it may require family firms to 
invest a tremendous amount of time and can be expensive in order to obtain such highly 
ranked and powerful political positions (Zhou, 2013). Yet, lower-ranked political ties (e.g., 
obtaining membership in policy forums and/or in trade associations) might be easier and less 
expensive for FFs to achieve; these lower-ranked connections, however, might not have a 
significant impact on firm performance. Thus, to counterbalance the lower performance in the 
presence of family CEOs and avoid the insignificant impact of their political connections, 
hiring an external CEO seems to be a viable way to reduce resource dependencies. This also 
resonates with the RDT prediction of the central role of external CEOs in reducing such 
dependencies (Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978).  
Nevertheless, additional analyses within the FF sample also suggest that FFs led by a 
family CEO could boost performance if they have boards with high political connection 
intensity. Hence, FFs that combine a family CEO with highly politically connected directors 
could help reduce resource dependencies in transition economies (Xu et al., 2015; Xu et al., 
2013; Wu, Wu, Zhou, & Wu, 2012). Indeed, the fact that boards have the role of connecting 
FFs with core external stakeholders would allow family CEOs to focus on their “full-time 
job” in implementing the firm’s strategy and preparing the next generation to take over, 
rather than channeling their resources to build personal political connections in this context.  
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Contributions and implications 
This study makes theoretical and practical contributions. First, by bringing into the debate the 
need to differentiate between emerging and transition economies when investigating 
performance differences between FFs and non-FFs, we further contend the fundamental role 
of institutional contexts that shape the economic landscape where different types of firms 
operate (Williamson, 2000; Williamson et al., 2008). Various new economic institutions 
embedded in transition economies play a key role in restraining or leveraging family 
specificities in the firm (Filatotchev et al., 2013; Aguilera, & Jackson, 2010; Banalieva et al., 
2015; Steier, 2009). By contextualizing the embedded institutional environment, we delineate 
performance differences between FFs vs. non-FFs as well as between FFs vs. former SOEs. 
Thus, through the lens of the new institutional economics, we are able to differentiate FFs 
from “traditional” emerging economies. We shed further insights into family characteristics 
in transition economies with respect to the arguments to discuss the superior performance of 
FFs in emerging markets, which mainly rely on accumulated bundles of resources and 
capabilities in the hands of multigenerational families. In transition economies, FFs can 
leverage on loyalty to the family, obligations to provide wealth for the family, stewardship-
oriented leadership, and the enormous desire to survive and grow after decades of being 
prohibited (Steier, 2009; Dang, & Vo, 2019).  
Second, findings in this article complement and extend the predictions of RDT 
(Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, & Salancik, 1978), with a focus on the role of the board 
of directors in securing essential external resources through political connections. Our 
findings implicitely suggest that, in order to be successful and best use their idiosyncratic 
characteristics, FFs need to gain external legitimacy through political connections (Zheng et 
al., 2017). Yet, it is fundamental to distinguish between politically connected CEOs and 
board directors. Seeking strategic resources by bringing into the FFs politically connected 
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directors, and developing and nurturing them through a unique “familial way,” in fact reduces 
dependencies (Hillman, 2005) by decreasing political discrimination (Xu et al., 2013), 
securing legal protection (Tang et al., 2013), and accessing resources for growth (Faccio, 
2006; Li et al., 2008). This practice enables FFs to sustain their superior performance with 
respect to other firm types in a new institutional economic environment. Additionally, our 
study enriches the governance literature in different ways. Most studies on boards of directors 
have mainly focused on the size of the board and/or the directing and monitoring roles played 
by executive vs. nonexecutive directors (Tran et al., 2014; Min, 2013; Prabowo, & Simpson, 
2011; Solomon, Lin, Norton, & Solomon, 2003). Our study shows that the board political 
connection intensity may affect FF performance in transition economies. In fact, when 
institutional changes are constant and fast in underdeveloped and government-controlled 
economic environments, the board political connections become the means for FFs to 
strengthen their performance in this context.  
Finally, our study also offers practical implications for family business owners. It 
indicates that, in order to strategically overcome the disadvantages related to the relative 
younger age, lack of legitimacy, and need to reduce resource dependencies, FFs in transition 
economies may decide to hire nonfamily CEOs who have professional experience and 
industrial knowledge. That would allow FF owners to focus on the business strategies and 
prepare for their first succession experience. Alternatively, family owners in the Vietnamese 
transition economy could capitalize on their family unique advantages by having family 
leadership combined with boards with multiple politically connected directors. Additionally, 
this finding also contributes to the debate on professionalization and the role of boards in 
sustaining family firm performance (Tabor, Chrisman, Madison, & Vardaman, 2018). Our 
findings also inform policymakers that they should reconsider the features of the institutional 
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ecosystem for organizations, markets, and political systems to promote further the growth of 
FFs in transition economies.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This study is not free from limitations that open different avenues for future research. First, 
although representative of FFs that are listed in Vietnam’s stock markets, our sample is not 
very large. Future research may also collect information on non-listed FFs to gain a more 
comprehensive picture of this firm type. Second, although this study tests different categories 
of political connections, such as connections of CEOs, and the political connection intensity 
of boards of directors, these connections are not sorted into a government-level hierarchy. 
Future research may need to test the effects of political connections between central 
governments (for instance, connections to the prime minister or ministers) and local 
governments (provincial level), as well as across subregions (Li et al., 2012). Indeed, 
different levels of connections across subregions may lead to different nuances of their 
impact on firm performance (Zhou, 2013; Banalieva et al., 2015). Third, although political 
connections have positive effects on performance, such connections are not a “free lunch.” 
There have been concerns about political costs (e.g., political liabilities) and negative effects 
on firm values and overall economies (e.g., minority shareholders’ expropriation, power 
abuse, and corruption) resulting from political connections (Dinh, & Calabrò, 2019; Chung, 
& Ding, 2010; Sun et al., 2016). Future research could explore what the associated costs are 
for FFs when they cultivate and seek benefits from political connections and the extent to 
which marginal benefits outweigh marginal costs. Moreover, this could be done by exploring 
curvilinear relationships between boards of directors’ political connection intensity and firm 
performance to further explore the existence of possible trade-offs. Nevertheless, this line of 
research assumes that a board of directors includes nonfamily members; future studies could 
34 
also consider the presence of family members appointed as directors and contributing to 
board political connection intensity. Fourth, our results also raise ethical questions 
concerning whether the practice of political connections is “filling” or “abusing” the 
institutional voids (Luo, & Chung, 2013). Despite the benefits, political connections might 
have detrimental effects in the form of “political liability” (Sun et al., 2016; Fan et al., 2007), 
which negatively affects firms’ value and overall economies (e.g., minority shareholders’ 
expropriation, power abuse, and corruption). Therefore, the ethics of establishing political 
connections by firms, in general, and FFs in particular is open for future debate. Additionally, 
the majority of Vietnamese FFs are in the first generation but will soon be “passing the 
baton” to the second generation. Future research may investigate whether political 
connections still have a critical effect on performance in the second or third generation, and 
how they are transmitted across generations. Fifth, yet importantly, we urge future research 
on FFs in emerging economies to dig deeper into the embedded institutional context, 
especially if this context is simultaneously a transition economy. Despite some similarities, 
transition economies exhibit different institutional economic characteristics. FFs in this 
context are characterized by their own idiosyncrasies that are different from “traditional 
family advantages,” which are commonly argued in multi-generation FFs in other 
institutional environments. Finally, future research may selectively draw from different but 
related theoretical approach when investigating the role and impact of leadership level on 
performance, for instance, Upper Echelons theory. This theoretical approach might shed 
further lights into the rationale behind the composition of top management team and the 
influence of external industry specific on performance of FFs in transition economies 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1: The moderation effect of CEO political connection on the relationship between type 
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Figure 2: The moderation effect of board political connection on the relationship between 
type of firms and firm performance (predictive margins with 95% CIs). 
 
 
Figure 3: Conditional marginal effect: family firms vs. nonfamily firms and family firms vs. 
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Figure 4: The moderator effect of board political connection on the relationship between 





Figure 5: Conditional marginal effect: family CEO vs. nonfamily CEO, differences at 
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Table 1: Description of variables 
Indicator Description 
ROA Return on assets: net income / total assets 
Types_of_firms Categorical variable: family firms = 1, former SOEs = 2, nonfamily firm = 3  
Family_firm Dummy variable: family firms = 1, otherwise = 0 
Former_SOE Dummy variable: former SOEs = 1, otherwise = 0 
Nonfamily_firm Dummy variable: nonfamily firm = 1, otherwise = 0 
Family_CEO Dummy variable: CEO is family member = 1, CEO is not family member = 0 
% Family_Ownership % of shares held by family members 
CEO_Connected Dummy variable: CEO is politically connected = 1, otherwise = 0 
Board_Political_Connection_Intenisty  
Ratio of total of politically connected directors and board size (in case of CEO duality, 
the CEO was removed from both numerator and denominator  
CEO_Duality Dummy variable: CEO duality = 1, otherwise = 0 
CEO_Age CEO age  
Board_Size (ln) Log of total number of board members 
Firm_Age Log of firm age (years since establishment) 
Firm_Size Log of total assets  
Firm_Leverage Total debts / total assets 
Year Dummy variables 
Industry 
Dummy variables (categorized according to North American Industry Classification 




Table 2a: Descriptive statistics and correlations (whole sample N = 1835) 
 Mean sd Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
                
1. ROA 5.08 5.72 -13.74 20.43            
2. Firm_Leverage 0.51 0.53 0.00 16.90 0.00989           
3. Firm_Size (ln) 27.21 1.60 23.13 33.29 0.0870*** 0.0703**          
4. Fim_Age (ln) 3.03 0.57 0.69 4.14 0.0223 -0.0193 -0.0345         
5. Board_Size (ln) 1.90 0.27 1.10 2.40 0.145*** -0.0261 0.0857*** -0.136***        
6. CEO_Duality 0.42 0.49 0 1 -0.0252 0.0136 -
0.0822*** 
-0.0585* -0.00660       
7. CEO_Age 49.20 8.36 24 75 0.00404 -
0.0894*** 
0.0351 0.207*** -0.0596* 0.193***      
8. FFs 0.30 .46 0 1 0.0938*** 0.00696 0.267*** -0.108*** -0.00121 0.111*** -0.0710**     
9. Former SOEs 0.19 .39 0 1 -0.00784 -0.0379 -0.129*** 0.106*** -0.0471* -0.0244 0.00611 -0.318***    
10. Non-FFs 0.51 .50 0 1 -
0.0799*** 
0.0233 -0.144*** 0.0157 0.0381 -
0.0828*** 
0.0603** -0.668*** -0.493***   
11. Board_Political_Connection_Intensity  0.04 0.08 0 0.6 0.0474* -0.00192 0.121*** -0.0505* -0.0147 -0.412*** -0.0416 -0.0269 0.190*** -0.124***  
12. CEO_Connected 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.0907*** 0.00115 0.0852*** 0.247*** -0.00245 0.0826*** 0.174*** -0.107*** 0.283*** -0.124*** 0.0906*** 





Table 2b: Descriptive statistics and correlations (family firm sample N = 460) 
 Mean sd Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. ROA 5.53 5.30 -10.44 20.43           
2. % Family_Ownership 35.42 17.70 6.26 82.31 0.0228          
3. Firm_Leverage 0.52 0.19 0.01 0.87 -0.351*** 0.135**         
4. Firm_Size (ln) 27.85 1.69 23.67 33.29 0.126** -0.0133 0.232***        
5. Firm_Age 2.96 0.54 0.69 4.08 0.139** -0.0782 -0.149** -0.178***       
6. Board_Size (ln) 1.90 0.28 1.10 2.40 0.105* -0.0645 -0.0311 0.137** -0.138**      
7. CEO_Duality 0.49 0.50 0 1 -0.0265 0.127** -0.0300 -0.0970* 0.199*** -0.0368     
8. CEO_Age 48.34 9.36 24 70 0.0716 0.0537 -0.199*** 0.111* 0.203*** -0.002 0.281***    
9. Family_CEO 0.30 0.46 0 1 -0.0518 -0.139** -0.128** -0.196*** 0.384*** 0.0614 0.0137 0.0976*   
10. CEO_Connected 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.0450 -0.159*** -0.0405 0.0433 0.385*** 0.0779 0.115* 0.152** 0.506***  
11. Board_Political_Conne
ction_Intensity 
0.04 0.09 0 0.5 0.126** -0.212*** -0.0263 0.195*** 0.0196 0.127** -0.332*** 0.0445 0.207*** 0.171*** 




Table 3: FGLS regression results ‒ types of firms and political connections (overall sample) 






Model 4  
ROA 
Firm_Leverage  -2.236*** -2.302*** -2.273*** -2.295*** 
 (0.365) (0.341) (0.341) (0.342) 
Firm_Size (ln) 0.160* -0.014 0.044 -0.001 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) 
Firm Age (ln) 0.446* 0.491* 0.415* 0.482* 
 (0.196) (0.197) (0.194) (0.192) 
Board_Size (ln) 0.265 0.640* 0.694* 0.570+ 
 (0.303) (0.317) (0.313) (0.316) 
CEO_Duality -0.973*** -0.901*** -0.898*** -0.823*** 
 (0.181) (0.198) (0.196) (0.196) 
CEO_Age 0.027* 0.030* 0.034** 0.024* 
 
 
(Family Firms as reference group) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Non-FFs  -0.898*  -0.238 
  (0.378)  (0.448) 
Former SOEs  -1.013***  -0.594* 
  (0.271)  (0.276) 
     
     
CEO_Connected  0.422+  0.477* 
  (0.255)  (0.243) 
Board_Political_Connection_Intensity  2.573* 3.072** 9.778*** 
 
 
(Family Firms* CEO_Connected as reference group) 
 
 (1.081) (0.981) (2.931) 
Non-FFs * CEO_Connected   -0.550  
   (0.524)  
Non-FFs * CEO_Nonconnected   -2.980***  
   (0.497)  
Former SOEs * CEO_Connected    -1.424**  
   (0.488)  
     
     
Former SOEs * CEO_Nonconnected   -1.350**  
   (0.459)  
     
     
Family Firms * CEO_Nonconnected   -0.594  
   (0.520)  
Non-FFs * Board_Political_Connection_Intensity     -10.540** 
    (3.722) 
Former SOEs * Board_Political_Connection_Intensity    -9.851** 
    (3.199) 
     
     
_cons 1.852 5.566* 4.554+ 5.082* 
 (2.269) (2.379) (2.333) (2.349) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 458.27 645.84 582.00 669.50 
Observations 1649 1649 1649 1649 
Number of ID 200 200 200 200 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4: FGLS regression results for family CEO and political connections (family firm 
sample) 






Model 4  
ROA 
% Family_Ownership -0.009 0.002 -0.002 -0.000 
 (-0.76) (0.23) (-0.17) (-0.01) 
Firm_Leverage -7.544*** -7.179*** -6.773*** -7.124*** 
 (-7.37) (-6.97) (-6.53) (-6.94) 
Firm_Size (ln) 0.579*** 0.743*** 0.703*** 0.770*** 
 (3.64) (4.63) (3.93) (4.91) 
Firm_Age (ln) 1.859*** 2.023*** 1.853*** 2.253*** 
 (4.18) (4.46) (3.82) (4.87) 
Board_Size (Ln) 0.885 0.921 0.909 1.126+ 
 (1.53) (1.51) (1.46) (1.82) 
CEO_Duality -0.714* -0.278 -0.390 -0.297 
 (-2.42) (-0.87) (-1.16) (-0.93) 
CEO_Age 0.005 -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.30) (-0.65) (-0.32) (-0.41) 
Family_CEO   -2.069*** -2.356*** -2.418*** 
  (-4.81) (-3.85) (-5.08) 
CEO_Connected  0.850+ 0.827 0.390 
  (1.74) (1.20) (0.76) 
Board_Political_Connection_Intensity  5.745+ 4.478 3.067 
  (1.75) (1.19) (0.75) 
Family_CEO * CEO_Connected   0.622  
   (0.67)  
Family_CEO * Board_Political_Connection_Intensity    10.424+ 
    (1.69) 
_cons -7.372+ -12.105** -10.930* -13.972** 
 (-1.75) (-2.72) (-2.21) (-3.10) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 271.51 406.91 305.22 440.13 
Observations 402 402 402 402 
Number of ID 60 60 60 60 
     
t statistics in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
